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vSummary
In recent years Irrigation Management Transfer
(IMT) and Joint Forest Management (JFM)
projects have been promoted with a view to
improve service provision in the agricultural
sector. Improved service provision it is presumed
would enhance access of resource poor
households to watershed services such as
irrigation and Non-Timber Forest Products
(NTFPs). This report draws on a survey and
case study evidence from 28 watershed
management groups in Haryana to argue that
participatory watershed management projects
need not necessarily safeguard the interests of
poorer rural households. We demonstrate that
given a particular institutional contract as in
Haryana, irrigation service provision by
contractors proved to be more effective than
provision by a community organization (HRMS)
in ensuring that water allocation, collection of
Irrigation Service Fees (ISF) and routine
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure was
undertaken. Our analysis of benefit distribution
reveals that wealthier landholding households
benefited more from management of irrigation
and forest resources when compared to
relatively poorer households. In conclusion this
report points out that although no blueprints for
promoting pro-poor community participation in
watershed management may be readily
available, certain principles are identifiable that
may include: ensuring transparency of policy
processes and predictability of institutional
contract to promote private sector participation in
irrigation service provision, ensuring fairness in
benefit distribution to facilitate compliance with
irrigation service rules and minimize potential for
conflicts and  promoting inter-sectoral policy
coordination by targeting subsidies for private
tubewells and addressing anomalies in the
nonfarm labor market with a view to dovetailing
watershed management projects within wider
regional programs of poverty alleviation.
1In recent years decentralized development
approaches have been promoted to realize the
goal of poverty reduction. In the agriculture sector
declining budgetary support and deteriorating
quality of service provision by parastatals the
world over has prompted an interest in Irrigation
Management Transfer (IMT) and Joint Forest
Management (JFM) policies. IMT and JFM
policies typically refer to devolving management
of previously publicly controlled forests or
irrigation systems to farmer groups or other
private-sector entities (International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) 1995:4). Donor
supported JFM and IMT projects have
encouraged co-management between parastatals
and farmer groups or the private sector to
undertake tasks of catchment protection, water
allocation, collection of Irrigation Service Fees
(ISF’s) and routine maintenance of irrigation
infrastructure in a watershed context1 (ADB 2001;
IWMI 2003).
There are essentially three arguments that
have been made in support of co-management in
watershed management. First, an institutional
contract that establishes accountable and
transparent procedures for management of land
and water resources could potentially encourage
participation of farmer groups or the private sector
in provision of rural services (ADB 1999; Alsop
et. al. 2000). Second, enhanced service provision
may improve access of marginal land- holding
and landless households to irrigation, fuelwood,
fibre and fodder grasses within watersheds (Kerr
2002; Ostrom 1996). Third, enhanced access of
poor rural households to irrigation services in
particular could potentially trigger off positive
economy-wide improvements in income streams
through increases in on-farm productivity and
greater integration in factor or product markets
(Bebbington 1999; Cox et. al. 2002).
In recent years through a number of
evaluations of watershed projects have pointed
out that co-management of watershed resources
need not necessarily guarantee adequate
attention to interests of poor rural households.
Studies have documented how powerful
landholders may collude to appropriate benefits of
watershed management at the expense of poorer
peasants2 (Bandhopadyay and Eschen 1988;
Platteau and Gaspart 2003). Second, studies
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1A watershed refers to a geo-hydrological unit that drains at a common point (Brooks et. al. 1992).
2Most discussions of equity issues in participatory irrigation management assume that large landholders would have their plots located
at the head end of an irrigation system while poor farmers would have their plots located at the tail end of a system. Similarly,
discussions of watershed or river basin management also assume that downstream users would bear the externalities caused by land
and water management practices of upstream resource users. While these assumptions may be true in specific instances it may prove
to be futile to generalize. This is because as a result of a practice of land scattering in large parts of north- west India large landholders
may have their farm plots distributed across different locations in an irrigation command. Similarly, it is not uncommon for upstream
resource users to either rent or purchase arable land in lower reaches of a watershed and thereby incur the costs imposed by
upstream resource use practices (see Kaul 1997).
2point out that landless households that depend on
public lands to meet a considerable portion of
their subsistence needs for fuelwood, fodder or
timber may suffer as a result of JFM-style
conservation measures that regulate their access
to such lands (Agarwal 1996). Third, studies of
watershed management in South Asia highlight
the fact that women may have to bear an
increased workload from an improvement in
access to irrigation due to doubling of
agricultural yields. (Arya et al.1998; Sarin
1999).
Interest in the plight of the rural poor and
their access to natural resources is reflected in
the recent debate on pro-poor growth. The pro-
poor growth debate emphasizes the fact that
institutional mechanisms that influence how the
benefits of economic growth are distributed are as
important, if not more important, than growth itself
(Ravallion 2000). Pro-poor growth is growth that
enables the poor to actively participate in and
significantly benefit from economic activity
(Kakwani and Pernia 2000:3). Promoting pro-poor
distribution of benefits of watershed management
requires a strategy that is deliberately biased
towards the poor so that the poor can benefit
proportionately more than the rich (Reddy et. al.
2004, Kurian et. al. forthcoming). Such an
outcome would rapidly reduce the incidence of
poverty so that those at the bottom end of the
distribution curve of consumption would have the
resources to meet their basic needs. Therefore,
to be effective a pro-poor strategy would entail
removal of institutional and policy induced biases
against the poor whether they are based on
differences in gender, ethnicity or regional context
(Agarwal 1997; Bebbington 1999).
This report is based on a study of a Ford
Foundation supported watershed management
project in the Haryana Shiwaliks. Three sets of
questions guided the research:
• To what extent does the institutional contract
for co-management of land and water
resources ensure attention to issues of
transparency and accountability in watershed
management? How are pro-poor concerns as
reflected in quotas for women in community
organizations, water rights for landless
households and management of community
funds addressed?
• How does the institutional contract for co-
management of watershed resources
influence provision of irrigation services?
Which mode of irrigation service provision
(i.e., by private individuals or community
organization) is more successful in ensuring
that water allocation, collection of ISF’s and
routine maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
is effectively undertaken?
• How does success with irrigation service
provision influence distribution of benefits and
costs within farmer groups? Do economy-wide
benefits relating to farmer incomes, cropping
intensity, and access to forest resources
such as fibre and fodder grasses and
fuelwood located in catchment areas
discriminate in favor of poorer households
and sub-groups such as women when
compared to wealthier groups?
The following sections of the report are
organized as follows. The section on “Overview of
the Study Area and Project Descriptions” provides
a profile of the study area and description of the
Haryana Ford Foundation watershed management
project. The section on “Data and Methods”
provides a description of the data base and
methodology adopted for the study. The section
on “Discussion on Study Findings” discusses the
main findings of the study focussing on a
discussion of performance of institutional
mechanisms for co-management of watershed
resources and distribution of benefits from dam
management and other economy-wide benefits
related to engagement in factor and product
markets. This section examines whether benefits
arising from co-management of watershed
resources have been pro-poor in their distribution
in the case of a Ford Foundation watershed
management project in the Shiwalik hills,
Haryana. The section on “ Conclusions” highlights
the main conclusions and policy implications of
the study.
3The Study Area
In recent years Haryana has emerged as one of
the most prosperous states in India. Driven by
irrigation expansion and large-scale adoption of
High Yielding Varieties (HYV) of green revolution
crops like paddy, cotton and sunflower, Haryana
has achieved impressive agricultural growth.
Impressive gains in farm wage rates have been
partly responsible for increases in per-capita
income (Narayanamoorthy 2001). However, on the
flip side Haryana has seen widening income
disparities between those mainly dependent on
casual agricultural work and those occupied in the
rural nonfarm sector (Bhalla 1999). Widening
income disparities probably explain why poverty
rates have increased in Haryana despite
increases in per-capita income. To add to this
Haryana has a poor record of land reforms as a
result of which land distribution is skewed
(Narayanamoorthy 2001; Sharma 1994). Access
to nonfarm jobs, a potential way to escape
poverty is, however, curtailed for certain groups
like women in rural communities (Agarwal 1997).
Panchkula district has the largest proportion
of land under forests in Haryana (HCFP 2000). As
a result the district has been a particularly
important focus of participatory forestry projects.
Since the early 1980s a spate of community
forestry initiatives have been undertaken: social
forestry, joint forest management and the Haryana
community forestry project. The Haryana Joint
Forest Management (JFM) Project was
responsible for developing an integrated model of
watershed management based on experiments
that were undertaken in the village of Sukhomajiri
between 1975 and 1985 (Arya and Samra 1995).
From the Haryana Forest Department’s (HFD)
point of view the Sukhomajiri watershed
management intervention was crucial to reduce
siltation of the Sukhna reservoir located further
downstream in the state capital of Chandigarh.
The Sukhomajiri model was premised on the
idea that a linear relationship exists between the
condition of forests located in the Shiwalik hills
and agricultural productivity in low lying plains
(see figure 1). As a result fodder production on
private fields was encouraged through provision of
irrigation from earthen dams in the expectation
that greater fodder and dung3 production from
irrigated fields would obviate the need to use
state-owned forests for fodder and fuelwood
extraction (Sarin 1996). Between 1984 and 1989
an attempt was made to scale up or replicate the
Sukhomajiri watershed model to about 35 micro-
watersheds located in Morni-Pinjore Forest
Division4 of Panchkula District in Haryana. An
important feature of the scaling up phase of the
project was the creation of institutional
mechanisms for sharing revenue from state
forests with local communities to promote
conservation of watershed resources.
The Haryana Joint Forest Management
Project—Pro-poor Features of the Co-
management Contract
In June of 1990, Haryana became one of the
earliest states of the Indian Union to adopt the
Central Government’s circular on JFM. There was
an explicit attempt to encourage participation of
rural communities in rehabilitation of degraded
public forests. Earthen dams that were
Overview of the Study Area and Project Description
3Cattle dung is used extensively as a cooking fuel in the Shiwalik region. Increased production of cattle dung it was assumed would
reduce pressure on state forests for supply of fuelwood for cooking purposes. An alternative approach to reducing pressure on
forests for fuelwood collection has been to facilitate greater adoption of non- biomass fuels like Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
technology for cooking purposes by rural populations. This strategy has been attempted at an all India scale by the Indian Ministry of
Non-Conventional Energy Sources (see Ramana1996).
4For administrative purposes Morni-Pinjore Forest Division is further subdivided into three forest ranges—Pinjore, Panchkula and Raipur
Rani.
4FIGURE 1.
The Sukhomajiri Watershed Model.
constructed acknowledged the intricate
relationship between access to irrigation in
downstream agricultural fields and patterns of
fuelwood collection from forests in upstream
areas. There was also an acknowledgment that
access of traditionally marginalized groups such
as the landless and women needed to be
safeguarded. Five features of the institutional
contract with an explicit focus on pro-poor
concerns may be outlined as follows: (TERI
1998):
• Tenure Reform: Water user associations were
constituted as Hill Resource Management
Societies (HRMS) under the Registration of
Societies Act, 1900. HRMS were given the
opportunity once a year to lease out rights to
harvest fibre grass from state-owned forests
located in the catchment area of earthen
dams. The lease price was fixed at the
average of the previous 3 years revenue of
the HFD from designated forest area.
Previously only paper mills had the right to
harvest fibre grass from such forests.
• Tradable Water Rights: Landless households
were given a share of water from dams
provided they were members of the HRMS.
Attempts were made to institute a system of
tradable water shares so that landless
households could sell their share of water to
other households. Tradable water rights, it
was reasoned, would place an economic
value on the use of water and thereby
increase the effectiveness of water use.
• Modalities for Private Sector Participation in
Watershed Management: We pointed out
earlier that HRMS could lease out rights to
harvest forest products on public forest lands
from the HFD annually. In the case of water
from earthen dams (built on public forest
land) water allocation rights purchased by the
HRMS could be further sublet to private
contractors at auctions held annually. In the
case of fibre grass private contractors were
to ensure that every household in the HRMS
received two head loads of fibre grass free to
meet subsistence requirements before
5deciding on its sale. In the case of water,
profits from the sale of water from earthen
dams were to be shared on a 50:50 percent
basis between the private contractor and the
HRMS.
• Access of Poor to Decision Making Forums:
The HFD was to facilitate annual elections of
the HRMS managing committee. At least a
third of positions in the managing committee
of the HRMS are to be reserved for women,
who form a traditionally marginalized group in
the Shiwalik region. Every woman in a
household was entitled to membership
distinct from membership of the male head of
household in the general body of HRMS.
Further, in cases where a HRMS comprised
of two villages, one relatively small and
powerless than the other, attention was paid
to issues like how revenue raised from sale
of water (and fibre and fodder grasses) could
be spent in a manner that benefited both
villages.
• Management of Community Funds: An
important principle followed regarding the use
of HRMS funds was that a proportion of
profits derived by the water contractor from
the sale of water from dams (and fibre and
fodder grasses) were to be deposited in the
HRMS common fund. A proportion of these
funds could then be used for community
development activities such as construction
of village roads, repair of school buildings or
construction of rest areas for laborers. Such
a provision would enable the use of public
funds for maintenance of economic and
social infrastructure in the village.
5The eight functioning dams were under the management of eight HRMS.
Data and Methods
Rapid Survey of Management of
Earthen Dams in Post-project Phase
Thirty-five HRMS were established in the Morni-
Pinjore Forest Division of Panchkula District in
Haryana. These 35 HRMS were responsible for
managing 54 earthen dams. The goal of the
survey was to visit all HRMS with earthen dams
in Morni-Pinjore Forest Division. However, due to
logistical constraints (roads being washed away in
the monsoon rains) we could visit only 28 HRMS.
This reduced our sample to 28 HRMS responsible
for managing 45 earthen dams. Our rapid survey
of the 28 HRMS in the Morni-Pinjore Forest
Division was undertaken over a period of one
month in the year 2000, during which information
was collected on variables like sources of fuel for
domestic household purposes and participation in
management of earthen dams.
The issue of participation in management of
earthen dams needs to be examined in the
context of the number of dams that were
functioning when this survey was undertaken. Our
survey revealed that only 8 of the 45 earthen
dams that were constructed in the Morni Pinjore
Forest Division were functioning in 2000 (Kurian
2003).5 We find that in cases where the
catchment stabilization principle was followed
earthen dams continued to function. The
catchment stabilization principle basically
emphasizes the need to form village forest
management organizations prior to dam
construction. Village-based organizations were to
institute rules regulating access to state forests
for fuelwood, fodder and fibre grass. In response
to regulated use of forest areas, earthen dams
6could be built. The assumption was that the
regulated forest use would have stabilized rates
of soil erosion and, as a result, increased the
lifespan of the dams (Arya and Samra 1995).
We undertook an assessment of earthen
dams in the Morni-Pinjore Forest Division by
examining three aspects: (a) Physical condition of
headworks, (b) physical condition of spillway and
(c) physical condition of distribution channels. Our
assessment revealed that approximately 31
percent of all dams that were constructed silted
up within 5 years of construction and 33 percent
within 10 years of construction (Kurian 2003).
Interestingly, 20 percent of dams constructed
functioned for less than a year. We notice there
are two clear periods of dam construction in
which it is possible to discern a relationship
between watershed institutions and the lifespan of
dams. The first period covering the Panchkula
Forest Range extended from 1984 to 1989. This
was a period in which scant attention was paid to
institutional issues related to setting up water
user groups. Instead emphasis was purely on
constructing earthen dams. As a result half of the
dams silted up within 5 years of construction.
During the second phase of dam
construction, which extended from 1990 to 1998,
we note a gradual movement towards Raipur Rani
forest range. During this phase new dams were
constructed and community-based organizations
were also established. The various
stakeholders— Ford Foundation, Tata Energy
Research Institute (TERI) and the HFD closely
monitored the process. As a result of closer
monitoring and greater transparency, dams
surviving beyond 5 years increased by 50
percent. Further, the proportion of dams silting up
within 5 years of construction fell from 50 percent
in the previous phase to 21.4 percent.
Nevertheless, we must emphasize that when
compared to the Sukhomajiri pilot phase, dam
performance had undergone a marked decline in
Raipur Rani. This is evident from figures on
numbers of dams surviving beyond 10 years from
construction. This we argue is because of the
failure to ensure catchment stabilization prior to
dam construction.
Case Study
Two of the eight HRMS with functioning dams-
Bharuali and Thadion were selected for a
comparative case study. We used five criteria to
arrive at the choice of Bharuali and Thadion
HRMS for a detailed case study. First, water
harvesting dams must be operational. Second,
HRMS must be functional. Third, one HRMS
(heterogeneous in endowment distribution) must
function relatively better than the other
(homogeneous in endowment distribution) with
regard to dam management. Fourth, HRMS must
be situated in close proximity to each other to
reduce differences in contextual factors like
distance from markets, slope, elevation and
forest type. Fifth, HMRS must be situated in
Raipur Rani forest range, where it was clear
based on the review of secondary data on
nonfarm employment that rural livelihoods depend
to a greater extent on agriculture and animal
husbandry. Two rounds of household surveys
were undertaken to cover all households in the
study sites of the Bharauli and Thadion HRMS.
The household surveys collected information on
household demography, cropping patterns, asset
ownership and participation in management of
earthen dams. Socioeconomic data was collected
using structured interviews, focused interviews
and group discussions.
Description of Case Study Sites—
Bharauli and Thadion HRMS
Demographic Features
Bharauli HRMS is composed of two settlements;
Bharauli, a relatively large village with 80
households and Sher Gujran with about 25
households. Sher Gujran village is located in the
catchment of the earthen dam while Bharauli lies
downstream of the dam. On the other hand
Thadion HRMS is composed of two villages—
Thadion with 50 households and Rethi village with
25 households (figure 2). Bharauli HRMS is
composed of four different caste groups
compared to Thadion HRMS that is composed of
7only one caste group. Given the greater diversity
of castes in Bharauli, some occupational
specialization based on caste identity is evident.
For instance, the Tarkhans or blacksmiths
undertake iron works for other caste groups. In
return for their services they are usually paid in
grain. Likewise, the Harijans have traditionally
worked as hired labor on other people’s fields or
as domestic helpers in the homes of large
landholders. In recent years Harijan households
have provided a source of labor for water
contractors to undertake routine repairs of earthen
dams. No such caste-based pattern of
occupational specialization exists in Thadion.
HRMS Designated Forest Area?
Shiwalik forests in the vicinity of Bharauli and
Thadion HRMS have been classified as “open
scrub”6 according to Survey of India topography
FIGURE 2.
Watershed areas of HRMS Bharauli and Thadion.
6Open scrub refers to degraded land in need of rehabilitation through soil and water conservation measures.
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87Tubewell density in Thadion is 2.8—i.e., seven tubewells in a command area of 20 ha.
8In another paper we argue that a higher water rate in Bharuali reflects a higher economic value that farmer’s place on supply of
water from earthen dams in the absence of private alternatives like tubewells (Kurian and Dietz 2004).
maps (Survey of India 1965). With the introduction
of joint forest management in the Shiwalik hills a
total of 712 ha of forest area was allotted to
Bharauli HRMS. This area comprises five forest
compartments. On the other hand, Thadion HRMS
was allotted a forest area of 354 ha, which
includes three forest compartments. Both Bharauli
and Thadion have one forest guard who is
appointed by the HFD and responsible for
monitoring forest use by local villagers.
Earthen Dams
There are two earthen dams in the study area,
each constructed by the state forest department.
In both cases the Shiwalik forests serve as their
catchment. The earthen dam at Bharauli was
constructed in 1990 at a cost of Rs 578,000
(US$1=Indian rupees 40), while the dam at
Thadion was constructed in 1993 at a cost of Rs
653,000. Although the dam in Bharauli was built
in 1990 the dam became functional only in
1995/96 after repairs had been made to it. The
catchment area of the dam at Bharauli is 39 ha,
while the area of the dam at Thadion is 15 ha.
Further, the command area of the dam at
Bharauli is 40 ha compared to 20 ha at
Thadion. Thirty-five households benefit from
irrigation from the dam in Bharauli, while fifteen
households benefit from dam assisted irrigation
in Thadion.
Alternative Irrigation on Dam-irrigated Land
None of the water-using households in Bharauli
have access to private tubewells as an alternative
source of irrigation for dam-irrigated land. In
Thadion, by contrast, there are seven tubewells
and 53 percent of water users have access to
them.7 From figure 2 it is possible to discern that
there are four distinct ecological zones: zone 1
groundwater can be tapped at a depth of between
200 to 300 feet compared to Zone II, where the
depth is approximately 50 feet. In Zone III
groundwater depth is in the range of 150-200 feet
while in Zone IV groundwater can be struck in
the range of between 25-30 feet. Drilling costs
which are a major factor in farmer’s decisions to
establish tubewells vary between Rs 18,000 to
reach a depth of 25 feet and Rs 50,000 to reach
a depth of 100 feet. It is not surprising, therefore,
that all seven tubewells in Thadion are located in
Zone IV.
Water Transport
Water is transported by plastic pipe from earthen
dams. The pipes are buried about 3 feet in the
ground. At strategic locations in the command
area, vertical exit valves are placed. At the ends
of the plastic pipeline, farmers dig artificial water
courses to transport water to their fields. Water
transport is dependent on gravity flow and
usually has to crisscross several fields. As a
result, water transport in some cases involves
negotiations between farmers to facilitate the
digging of channels to divert water towards their
fields. Here, locally embedded notions of a fair
allocation are critical to avoiding conflicts. Large
farmers with plots located at different points in
the dam command have to balance their
interests for water with those of small
landholders.
Water Use Rules
Water in earthen dams is harvested during the
monsoon period (June to September). Harvested
water is then used during the rabi season
primarily for the wheat crop. Water users in
Bharauli are charged Rs 20 per hour of water
used from the dam compared to Rs 10 per hour
in Thadion.8 Three to four rounds of watering are
possible in both Bharauli and Thadion. Rules
stipulate that water allocation should take place
on a rotational (hourly) basis for the wheat crop.
9During each round farmers whose lands are
situated closer to the dam are supplied water
first, after which water is released for use by
farmers farther down the distribution channel.9
9We may recall from earlier in the discussion that a system of tradable water shares was introduced by the JFM project. This meant
that landless households in particular who did not have a need for irrigation water could sell their share of water to other households.
But our study indicates that the system of tradable water shares was not being implemented in Bharauli.
10Our survey found that of the eight HRMS with functioning dams, only five showed evidence of service provision. Four of these
groups were heterogeneous and three of them were under contractor-based service provision. Of the three groups that failed in
service provisioning two were homogeneous groups and both of them were under HRMS provisioning (for a detailed discussion see
Kurian et al. 2003; Kurian et.al. 2004).
11In another paper we point out that in the absence of a sufficient number of cases (only 8) it is impossible to statistically test the
relationship between group composition and service provision. We also caution that in the absence of an individual with leadership
qualities, even group heterogeneity may have been insufficient to provide effective water provisioning. Therefore, specificity of local
conditions means that is difficult to generate blueprints for collective action (see Kurian and Dietz, 2004; Pottete and Ostrom, 2004).
Discussion of Study Findings
This study posed three sets of research
questions. First, to what extent does the
institutional contract for co-management of land
and water resources ensure attention to issues of
transparency and accountability in watershed
management. Second, how does the institutional
contract for co-management of watershed
resources influence provision of irrigation services
and third, how does success with irrigation
service provision influence distribution of benefits
and costs within the farmer groups. The
discussion in sections on “Overview of the Study
Area and Project Descriptions” and “Data and
Methods,” respectively, addressed the first
research question. In this section we address the
second and third research questions.
Group Composition, Service Provision and
Effectiveness of Water Management
Our discussion in the section on “Overview of the
Study Area and Project Description” highlighted
the pro-poor features of a co-management
contract in Haryana. An important feature of the
co-management contract included modalities for
private sector participation in watershed
management. In this section we examine how
modalities for private sector participation influence
provision of irrigation services in a watershed
context. In subsequent subsections we examine
to what extent economy-wide benefits of success
with water provisioning are pro-poor in their
distribution.
Our survey of eight HRMS with functioning
dams indicates that groups that were relatively
heterogeneous in distribution of nature-based
endowments tended to facilitate the emergence of
water contractors.10 Further, evidence suggests
that provision of irrigation services tended to be
more effective in terms of water allocation,
collection of ISF’s and routine maintenance when
under contractor management than when under
HRMS management.11 Our case study of Bharauli
HRMS, under contractor-based irrigation service
provisioning highlights the underlying reasons for
such success.
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Group Composition and Mode of Service
Provision
Our examination of coefficient of variation of
variables used in construction of a composite
household endowment score12 for two data sets
from 1996 and 2000 in Bharauli supports our
contention regarding group composition and
service provision. Two factors merit particular
attention (table 1).
• Group heterogeneity in Bharauli is greater
than in Thadion at both points in time (1996
and 2000)
• Bharuali appears to be becoming more
heterogeneous over time while Thadion is
becoming more homogeneous
A useful way to understand reasons behind
such trends in group heterogeneity is to examine
each of the four variables that went into
calculations of household endowment scores. We
estimated the coefficient of variation of each of
the following variables: average land irrigated,
average size of rain-fed land owned, livestock
composition and average family size.We observe
that patterns of variance are comparable for all
variables except for average irrigated land
(table 2). We, therefore, argue that the land area
irrigated by the earthen dam in Bharauli had the
greatest explanatory power for understanding
trends captured in the movement of endowment
scores for both water user groups.13
An important observation may be made in
this context: the level of group heterogeneity in
Bharauli was increasing because although a
greater proportion of water users (compared to
Thadion) were receiving water from the dam, not
all their plots were being irrigated. In such a
situation, factors like location of plots in relation
to the earthen dam play a crucial role in
determining what proportion of a farmer’s total
plots may be irrigated. By contrast, in Thadion
proliferation of tubewells offered water users an
alternative source of irrigation. As a result
12For a detailed description of methodology for construction of household endowment scores see Kurian and Dietz, 2004.
13In the absence of alternative sources of irrigation in Bharauli the relationship between total land area under irrigation and that which
benefits from supply of water from the dam can be examined in a relatively straight forward manner. To test the explanatory power of
dam-assisted irrigation we ran a regression using total land area irrigated (Dependent Variable) and area irrigated by dam (Independent
Variable). We found a robust relationship between both variables.
TABLE 2.
Co-efficient of Variation for Variables Used in Calculation of Endowment Scores.
Variable Co-efficient of Variation (Bharuali) Co-efficient of Variation (Thadion)
Average Irrigated Land 83.3 64.1
Average size of Land Owned 51 55.1
Average Number of Livestock 82.6 86.6
Average Family Size 40 45.7
TABLE 1.
 Changes in Household Endowment Scores in HRMS.
HRMS Distribution of household endowments in 1996 Distribution of household endowments in 2000
Bharauli 61.4 69.1
Thadion 46.6 33.6
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water user’s plots situated at a distance from
the dam distribution network could still receive
irrigation from tubewells. This explains why
with an expansion of tubewell irrigation, the
level of group heterogeneity was declining over
time in Thadion.
Increasing group heterogeneity in Bharauli in
the absence of access to tubewell irrigation has
made certain farmers relatively well endowed in
comparison to others in the water user group
there. In particular, we found that household No.
54 had a particular interest in ensuring effective
water provisioning. This was because all his farm
plots were scattered at the end of each of the
three distribution channels of the dam. His
emergence as a water contractor in Bharauli was
facilitated by the absence of other farmers of
comparative wealth and power14 (Vedeld 2000).
Effectiveness of Water Management—A
Comparison of Bharauli and Thadion HRMS
A. Collection of Irrigation Service Fees
In the previous section we pointed out that
relatively heterogeneous groups had the potential
to facilitate contractor-based irrigation service
provision. In this section we turn to examine how
water management from earthen dams under
contractor-based service provision fared when
compared to provisioning under a community
organization (HRMS). To do this we examined
three aspects of water management: Collection of
ISF’s, water allocation and contributions towards
routine maintenance of earthen dams.
Household surveys in Bharauli revealed that
91 percent of dam users received water for 4–5
months during the rabi season (winter season)
compared to only 28 percent of water users in
Thadion. Therefore, one may argue that due to
the assured supply of water from the earthen dam
and a sense of fairness associated with water
distribution water users in Bharuali adhered to
rules of payment of water fees to the contractor.
We observe that in 1995–1996 the HRMS
monitored water distribution from dams in Bharauli
and Thadion. In Bharauli water users complied
with payment of hourly water charges of Rs 20
while in Thadion compliance was nil although
water user charges were lower at Rs 10 per hour.
In the 1996–1997 too, both dams were under
HRMS management and the trends with
compliance with user charges were similar. In
1997–1998 both HRMS adopted contractor-based
water provisioning. In Bharauli the contractor paid
the lease amount of Rs 3,000 to the HRMS,
whereas in Thadion the contractor failed to do so.
However, due to poor rains that year the
contractor could not net a profit from water sales
in 1997.15
In 1998–1999 both water user groups adopted
contractor-based provisioning once more. In
Bharauli the contractor paid up the lease amount
to the HRMS while in Thadion three individuals
who combined to bid for the purchase of lease
rights could only pay 22 percent of the lease
amount pledged to the HRMS. That same year
higher levels of compliance with payment of water
user fees enabled the contractor in Bharauli to
net a profit of Rs 7,500. The same trend was
repeated for 1999–2000, but in Thadion a
history of noncompliance with water user
charges resulted in reversion to HRMS water
provisioning. But by 1999–2000 repeated failure
of the institutional mechanism for managing the
dam in Thadion led to siltation of the dam in
the village.
B. Water Allocation Rules
We adapted Ostrom’s use of “water availability
difference” to examine predictability in availability
of water among peasants at the head-end and
tail-end of the dam distribution network (Ostrom
14Our analysis also indicates that historically the water contractor has enjoyed an influential position in the village power structure—
being a source of credit and representing Bharuali in the panchayat (or local government) (for a discussion see Kurian et. al. 2003).
15Mean annual rainfall in the study area declined to 1,188.5 mm in 1997 compared to 1,395.8 mm and 1,372.7 mm in 1995 and
1996, respectively (Central Soil and Water Conservation Research and Training Institute Research Centre 2000).
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TABLE 3.
Level of Predictability in Access to Water from Earthen Dams.
HRMS Water Predictability among Water Predictability   Difference in Water
 Users at Head of among Users at Tail of Predictability Between
 Distribution Network Distribution Network Head-End and Tail-End Users
Bharauli 1.8 1.3 0.5
Thadion 1.7 0.1 1.6
1994: 552).16 The difference in predictability of
water supply between head-end and tail-end
peasants was lower in Bharauli than in Thadion
(table 3). This finding indicates a higher level of
effectiveness associated with lower level of
conflict among farmers and greater clarity about
water use rules.17
Another indication of the effectiveness of
the water distribution system is the difference
between average water requirement and water
availability. Based on rule of thumb
calculations of water requirements during the
rabi season and mean land sizes we arrived at
the difference between water requirements and
water availability.18 In Bharauli relatively more
effective water management rules guaranteed
water access to a relatively large number of
households from the dam. This is reflected in
the fact that both head and tail-end water users
enjoyed more or less similar levels of
confidence that they would receive their share
of water from the dam. In Thadion, by contrast,
because head-end households tended to
monopolize use of water, the difference
between water availability and requirement is
double. Greater effectiveness of water use of
the water-harvesting dam is also reflected in
the expansion of the Bharauli distribution
network. In response to higher profits from
water sales, the water contractor responsible
for water distribution expanded the distribution
network in 1999/2000 to provide irrigation to 15
additional households. As a result, a total of
7.9 hectares was brought under irrigation.
16We allotted weights to qualitative assessments of how predictable farmer’s access to water from earthen dams was in Bharauli and
Thadion. By predictable we refer to how confident a farmer was that the dam water user with a plot adjacent to his would release
water to him for his use. Accordingly, we allocated weights depending on whether a farmer’s access to water was high (2), medium (1)
or low (0). The values that we arrived at for Bharauli and Thadion HRMS represent an aggregation of individual farmer responses to
our query on level of predictability in access to water from earthen dams.
17Discussions in Thadion revealed that two households removed distribution pipes to level their fields and never replaced them. In
response, Somnath, a large landholder, installed a siphon and pumped water out from the dam to his field using a circuitous route.
Pumping water using a siphon can silt the dam, and so other farmers rejected this idea. As a result, Amarjeet, Somnath’s uncle
pledged to siphon water and desilt the dam regularly using his own funds. Amarjeet began charging farmers a fee to siphon water to
their fields on the pretext of recovering his investment for dam de-silting works that he planned to undertake. However, in reality he
did not undertake de-silting work on the dam as he had promised. Somnath rejected this practice and began a parallel scheme of
water siphoning. Somnath pledged that he would stop a parallel scheme of water siphoning only if his uncle began de-silting work on
the dam. The continuing conflict between these two individuals led to eventual silting of the dam in March, 2001. As a result access
of the other 13 households to water from the dam was compromised.
18During a period of normal rainfall three waterings are required for a wheat crop.Four hours are required to water 0.405 hectares of
wheat crop from the dam.Mean land size among water users in Bharauli is 1.9 hectares. Therefore, mean per-capita water requirement
for wheat for water users in Bharauli is 18.8 hours (4.7 x 4).But in 1999-2000 a total of 555 hours of water was supplied in Bharauli at
a mean per-capita rate of 16.1 hours.In Thadion mean land size is 2.3 hectares.Therefore, mean per- capita water requirement for
water users is 23.2 hours (5.8 x 4).But in 1999-2000 a total of 479 hours of water was supplied in Thadion at a mean per capita rate
of 32 hours. This leads us to conclude: 1. that per-capita use of water from the dam in Thadion was higher largely due to greater
demand for irrigation to augment supply from private tubewells for paddy cultivation in the wet season and 2. That a larger number of
farmers in Thadion could potentially benefit from dam-assisted irrigation for wheat cultivation in the dry season if water is not used to
irrigate paddy during the wet season.
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In Thadion by contrast, proliferation of
tubewells lead dam water users to utilize water
from the earthen dam to cultivate paddy.19
Farmers with access to tubewells tend to view
earthen dams as a supplemental source of
irrigation for rice cultivation. Households belonging
to a single extended family (gotra) with farm plots
located at the head end of the irrigation system
monopolize water use thereby depriving other
households of their share during the rabi season.
Households without access to tubewells, as we
pointed out earlier are adversely affected by
conflicts at the head-end of the irrigation system
because their ability to raise crops other than rice
to meet household food requirements is curbed.20
C. Participation in Repair and Maintenance of
Earthen Dams
We find that peasants in Bharauli cooperate with
the contractor in undertaking routine maintenance
activities. In Bharauli between 1995 and 2000 the
mean number of labor days contributed towards
maintenance of the distribution network was 3.7
compared to 2.3 in Thadion. Further, the mean
monetary contribution towards maintaining the
distribution network was Rs 377 compared to
Rs 156 in Thadion. Greater success with routine
maintenance of dams may be explained by a
historically defined labor exchange system. We
find that in many cases landless households who
were recipients of credit and grain from the water
contractor during periods of droughts in earlier
years offered their labor to undertake repairs of
dams. Very often their services are not paid for in
cash but are adjusted in the form of credit or
grain that they received during distress periods.21
Economy-Wide Benefits of Success
with Contractor-Based Water
Provisioning—What Evidence of a Pro-
Poor Distribution?
We observed in the previous section that
irrigation service provision was more effective in
Bharauli when compared to Thadion. The
relatively greater success in the management of
the dam in Bharuali could be attributed to the
absence of alternative sources of irrigation like
tubewells, scattering of water contractor’s plots at
the tail end of the distribution channels and the
absence of factional conflicts among wealthy
landholders. Such a situation enabled a well
endowed individual from among the water users
to undertake a leadership role in monitoring water
distribution, collection of service fees and
undertaking of routine maintenance work. But did
relatively greater success with watershed
management in Bharuali guarantee sufficient
attention to pro-poor concerns? In other words did
the distribution of economy-wide benefits from
watershed management favor traditionally
marginalized groups like the landless, marginal
landholding households and women? In this
section we attempt to answer this question by
stratifying the Bharauli water user group and
examining the distribution of economy-wide
benefits from watershed management.
19It must be noted that farmers who did not own a tubewell purchased water from those who owned tubewells, thereby effectively
spreading the influence of tubewell irrigation to all households with farm plots located at the head end of the irrigation command of
the earthen dam. Expansion of tubewell irrigation in Thadion was reflected in a higher percentage of households (46.6%) cultivating
paddy compared to only (9%) of households in Bharauli.
20In addition to equity aspects studies in India have also highlighted the adverse environmental effects of unbridled tubewell expansion
that has taken place in the context of state subsidies for purchase of inputs like diesel and hardware such as pump-sets (Shah1993).
The negative equity and environmental effects of tubewell proliferation has the potential to undermine the collective action in watershed
management.
21For a discussion on inter-locking factor markets in Haryana (see Bardhan 1984:61).
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A. Stratifying Water User Groups
Stratification of groups is one way in which the
distribution of benefits from watershed
management can be understood. We used scatter
diagrams to examine the distribution of
households in terms of their ownership of
endowments. Based on the scatter diagram we
stratified water user groups into three endowment
categories: low (0–9.9), medium (10–19.9) and
high (20–40).We observed that in Bharauli 3
households are located in the high endowment
category, 23 households in the medium
endowment category and 9 households in the low
endowment category.22 On the basis of
stratification we examined the distribution of
benefits by focusing on four aspects:
• Agricultural Production Strategies
• Nonfarm Income
• Irrigation Access and Status of Women
• Access to Forest Resources in Catchment
Areas
B. Agricultural Production Strategies
Cropping patterns. The main agricultural crops
grown in Bharauli watershed are wheat, paddy,
corn and radishes. Corn and paddy are grown
during the kharif season, which extends from mid-
June to October. Wheat and radishes are
primarily grown during the rabi season, which
extends from November to April. Paddy requires
large quantities of standing water, in contrast to
corn, wheat and radishes, all of which use
smaller doses of water at particular periods during
the growth cycle in order to retain productivity.
We observed differences in cropping patterns
across endowment clusters in Bharauli. For
instance, we noted that households in the lower
and middle categories raise corn, wheat, paddy
and radishes. Households in the high category in
Bharauli , however, raise corn, wheat and
radishes, but do not cultivate paddy.
Labor hiring. Farmers’ cropping preferences
influence their patterns of labor hiring. For
instance, peasants in the high endowment
category in Bharauli hire labor during the winter
season to harvest wheat and radishes. This is
probably explained by the fact that peasant
households in Bharauli cultivate both wheat and
radishes, which must be harvested at the same
time in the month of April. With relatively smaller
families (average of four) family labor alone would
be unable to perform the harvesting operations.
There is also an interesting difference in the
type of labor hired in Bharauli. In Bharauli we find
a greater reliance on female labor, especially
during the harvesting of paddy. Interestingly
though, most of the labor for on-farm operations
comes from outside the village. Interviews
revealed that laborers from the state of Bihar
arrive during the harvesting period and accept
lower wages than village residents. Landless
households in Bharauli, on the other hand, find it
more remunerative to take daily wage jobs in
nearby towns.
Crop productivity. The per acre productivity of
wheat is highest among households in the high
endowment category in Bharauli. In fact,
households in the high endowment category had
the largest area under irrigation. A large aggregate
area under irrigation by dams was identified by
the higher cropping intensity, per acre application
of fertilizers and use of hired labor (table 4).
Agricultural returns. The total returns to
agricultural activity are a function of price, per
acre productivity and acreage. In the Panchkula
district, farmers receive similar prices for most
major agricultural crops. Therefore, returns are
primarily a function of per acre productivity and
acreage. In Bharauli agricultural returns23 were
consistently higher for peasants in the high
endowment cluster for all crops with the
exception of returns to the radish crop.
22In this context it is important to note that water users in Bharauli and Thadion do not practice share-cropping.
23Higher agricultural returns have been aided by secular increases in agricultural terms of trade for wheat and maize, two principal
crops grown in the region (GoH 2000).
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In the case of radish, despite the fact that
households in the high endowment cluster
devoteda larger percentage of their land to
cultivate radishes, their returns from this activity
were in comparison lower to other crops. This is
probably explained by lower per acre productivity.
We may recall from our earlier discussion that
households in the high endowment category
resorted to labor hiring for farm operations during
the busy month of April when both wheat and
radishes are harvested. One may speculate that
lower labor productivity associated with the use of
hired labor instead of family labor is responsible
for the lower per acre productivity of radishes on
farms of peasants in the high endowment
category.24
Farm-based income. Income from the sale of
agricultural crops and from animal husbandry may
be included under farm-based income. In
Bharauli, mean farm-based incomes are the
highest for households in the high endowment
cluster. Livestock incomes constitute 7.1 percent,
15.8 percent and 27 percent of farm-based
incomes, respectively, for households in high,
middle and low endowment clusters. This
suggests that diversification into livestock rearing
is a strategy adopted by relatively poorer
households to guard against the climate-based
risks associated with reliance on smallholder
agriculture (Ellis 1998).
C. Do Nonfarm Incomes Favor the Rural Poor?
Our analysis indicates that farm-based incomes
tended to favor wealthier landholding households.
In the ensuing discussion we ask if nonfarm
incomes discriminate in favor of poorer
households to compensate for the bias that farm-
based incomes have towards wealthier land-
holding households. Our analysis indicates that
nonfarm employment exhibits great variety. The
main types of nonfarm jobs in the area are stone
quarrying, truck driving and employment in
government departments like water supply,
electricity and public works. Other nonfarm
sources of income include family transport
business and pensions for aged persons and
retired army personal. In Bharauli 44 percent of
nonfarm jobs involved employment in government
departments like water supply or the electricity
department. Stone quarrying accounted for a
further 33 percent of nonfarm income in the
village, while the rest was accounted for by
government pensions, truck driving and daily
wage employment in nearby towns.
In Bharauli, 66 percent of government sector
jobs were captured by households in the low
endowment category. Similarly, 88 percent of the
stone quarrying jobs in the village were
undertaken by households in the low category.
The lone truck-driving job was undertaken by a
household in the high endowment category. Two
of the daily wage jobs, involving work in house
construction in nearby towns, were undertaken by
households in the low income category. It is
important to note in this context that most of the
nonfarm jobs involved low-level skills and training
and, therefore, posed few entry barriers for
24We acknowledge this to be a weakness of the study design as a result of which it is difficult to assert that family labor has potential
to increase per acre productivity in contrast to hired labor.
TABLE 4.
Cropping Intensity and use of Inputs in Bharauli Micro-Watershed.
Endowment Cropping Intensity Per Acre Fertilizer Percentage of Households Area Irrigated by Earthen
Category Rate  Application(kilos)  Hiring in Labor Dam(in acres)
High 196.0 216.6 100 3.0
Medium 175.4 211.1 66.6 2.1
Low 185.7 191.5 60.0 1.2
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FIGURE 3.
Nonfarm income and rural inequality in Bharauli HRMS.
households. Our analysis indicates that nonfarm
incomes contribute immensely to household
income, especially for low and medium
category households in Bharauli. In fact,
nonfarm income constitutes 28.9 percent of
income for high endowment category
households, 44.4 percent for medium category
households and 60 percent for low endowment
category households.
Considering the importance of nonfarm
income in sustaining the livelihoods of rural
households it is pertinent to ask “To what
extent does nonfarm income influence patterns
of rural income inequality?” Our analysis
indicates that nonagricultural incomes can
potentially reduce inequalities in the distribution
of household incomes. The inequality-reducing
potential of nonagricultural income is reflected
in the transformations shown in the box plot of
farm-based income (figure 3). The mean of the
distribution moves up marginally while the
number of outliers decreases from three to two.
Also noticeable is that the range of incomes
increases among the low category households,
although the mean income level drops
marginally. In the medium category, the mean
level of income actually increases. In the high
endowment category, the mean level of income
drops when nonfarm incomes were taken into
consideration. However, we must concede that
despite the inequality-reducing impact of nonfarm
incomes, the overall distribution of total income
still favors households in the high endowment
category.
The landless laborer and nonfarm employment.
Our analysis of nonfarm incomes reveals that
nonfarm income definitely reduces level of
inequality in the distribution of total household
incomes. However, the overall distribution of total
incomes still favors households in the high
endowment category. In other words nonfarm
incomes do not discriminate in favor of poorer
households to the extent that they can
compensate for the bias that farm incomes have
towards wealthier households. There are two
striking features of livelihoods of landless
households. First, a larger proportion of landless
households (about 45%) rely on daily wage jobs,
which are low paying when compared to jobs
engaged in by low endowment category
households (table 5). We noted earlier on that 66
percent of government jobs and 88 percent of
stone quarrying jobs, both of which were relatively
high paying were undertaken by low endowment
category households. By contrast only 35 percent
of landless households had access to stone
quarrying jobs.
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A second feature in the livelihoods of
landless households is the increasing competition
they are facing from agricultural laborers. Two
factors probably influence competition for farm
jobs. First, employment is available for only a
brief period during the harvest. The number of
days that employment is available throughout the
year does not exceed 40. As a result, landless
households prefer to work outside the village
rather than take up agricultural jobs during the
harvest season. Second, as noted earlier, migrant
labor from Bihar are prepared to work for lower
wages than local labor, thus making them a more
attractive proposition for households hiring in
labor. Sheila Bhalla (1999) in reviewing changes
in the workforce composition in rural Haryana
makes the following points:
• The latest rural labor inquiry suggests that in
1987/1988, 67 percent of rural labor in
Haryana cultivated land. Similar figures
ranged between 7 percent and 8 percent in
the preceding decade. What has happened is
that members of households that had
previously stuck mainly to cultivation
accepted jobs as hired agricultural laborers in
large numbers.
• In the decade ending in 1991, demographic
pressure reduced the number of men who
reported their main work as cultivation by
some 6 percent. Simultaneously, the
agricultural labor group grew by more than 4
percent.
• In Haryana the rapid expansion of demand for
hired laborers that characterized the early
years of the Green Revolution, attracted a
surge of workers from small farm households
who had entered the hired labor market. By
1972/1973, this trend had become a major
source of grievance for the landless, who
complained thatlanded households “were
taking their jobs” (Bhalla 1999: 47–48).
D. Irrigation Access and Status of Women
Our analysis of the livelihood strategies of
relatively poorer landless households reveals
increasing competition with landed households for
nonfarm jobs that have traditionally been the
bastion of the landless. In other words, nonfarm
incomes do not discriminate in favor of poorer
households in a manner that compensates for the
bias that farm-based incomes inherently have
towards wealthier households. Our analysis
indicates that women, another traditionally
marginalized group, especially drawn from poorer
households, suffer from higher workloads as a
result of the higher agricultural productivity
associated with improved access to irrigation
from earthen dams. Focused group discussions
indicate that women make more trips transporting
fodder grass from fields to their homes when
compared to men. Second, when decisions are
made to increase cattle herd sizes to maximize
returns from the sale of milk, women end up
spending more time feeding and bathing cattle.
Third, unlike grass from forest areas, fodder
TABLE 5.
Annual Returns on Nonfarm Jobs in Study Area.
Job Type Availability of Employment Annual Returns in rupees
Stone quarrying 8 months, for 20 days in a month, at a wage of Rs 75 per day 18,000
Government service 12 months at Rs 2,000 per month 24,000
State pension 12 months at Rs 200 per month 2,400
Daily wage 8 months, for 20 days in a month, at a wage of Rs 60 per day 9,600
Truck driving 12 months at Rs 100 per day for 30 days in a month 36,000
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grass from agricultural fields has to be threshed
in a machine before it is fed to livestock.
Women’s involvement has increased in this task
and will rise with an increase in fodder grass
production from agricultural fields.25
Notwithstanding the increased workload of
women there are limited avenues open to them to
renegotiate a redistribution of benefits and costs
arising from participatory watershed management.
This is because women are effectively excluded
from participation in decision making forums
relating to the management of earthen dams.
They are not invited to meetings of the HRMS
and their membership status in community
organizations remains unclear. Even if they do
attend meetings organized by the HRMS, cultural
norms that prescribe that it is improper for women
to speak up in front of men effectively relegate
their views on natural resource management
priorities to the back burner. This was reflected in
the expenditure patterns of HRMS that
predominantly reflected male priorities (construction
of temples and meeting halls for elders from which
women are excluded) as against women’s priorities
like the repair of village school and the provision of
drinking water on taps.26
E. Access to Forest Resources in Catchment
Areas
Irrigation and Fodder Grass Production on Private
Fields. Earlier on in the discussion we
emphasized that one of the core assumptions
guiding the Haryana Forest Department’s decision
to construct earthen dams was that it would
facilitate increased fodder grass production on
private fields. Increased fodder production could
facilitate greater dung production by facilitating
livestock rearing. Greater dung production
presumably would reduce fuelwood collection from
state forests for cooking purposes.
In order to understand whether irrigation
provided by earthen dams induces peasants to
grow fodder grass on their agricultural fields
during the rabi period, we ran a linear regression.
We found that the potential for fodder grass
production was greater on fields with access to
irrigation from the dam.27 We followed up the
regression with another to examine the
relationship between fodder grass production on
private fields and dung production in the winter
season. The tables show a positive relationship
that suggests that when dam-assisted irrigation is
available during the winter period, dung production
is also at its all-year high.
To conclude this line of examination, we ran
one more regression to explore whether higher
levels of dung production had any influence on
the intensity of fuelwood extraction during the
winter. We found a negative relationship between
the level of dung production and intensity of
fuelwood extraction from state forests. This
implies that households with better access to
irrigation in the winter (rabi season) had higher
production of dung, which is used as a substitute
for cooking fuel. This lowered fuelwood extraction
from state forests.28
25In the case of fodder grass collection from forest areas as well we found a clear relationship between gender and class. For instance,
in the high and medium category of households fuelwood collection is primarily undertaken by male members of the household.
However, low and landless categories of households rely on women and young girls to a greater extent to undertake fuelwood
collection. This is primarily because male members from approximately 80 percent of landless category households were engaged in
low paying nonfarm jobs in nearby towns.
26We acknowledge from the point of view of watershed management that attention by community organizations towards the routine
maintenance activity may be considered favorably. However, our intention here is to highlight the fact that when women are not
adequately involved in decision making when it comes to watershed management and interventions may offer them limited benefits
when compared to men. From the perspective of empowering traditionally marginalized groups like women therefore, such interventions
may fare less favorably.
27Fodder production refers to both fodder raised as a crop as well as fodder as agricultural residue. In the case of the latter we
acknowledge that higher levels of agricultural productivity may result in higher fodder production. Implicit in this assumption is the fact
that households in the high endowment category (with demonstrated levels of agricultural productivity) had the potential to achieve
higher rates of fodder production on a per acre basis.
28Discussions revealed that fuelwood collection from state forests is highest during winter when compared to summer and monsoon
seasons.
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Irrigation Intensity and Fodder Grass Production
on Private Fields. We pointed out earlier in the
discussion that household’s in the high
endowment category had the largest acreage
under dam assisted irrigation. However, contrary
to the project assumption, that greater access to
irrigation would decrease levels of fuelwood
extraction from state forests, we found that
households in the high endowment group with
largest acreage under dam-assisted irrigation were
actually extracting greater amounts of fuelwood
from state forests compared to households in the
medium and low categories (table 6). This finding
is explained by three factors:
• Arable land irrigated by earthen dams as a
percentage of total irrigated land was the
lowest for households in the high
endowment category. The percentage of
land irrigated by earthen dams as a
proportion of total irrigated land was 36
percent, 45 percent and 70 percent,
respectively, for high, medium and low
endowment category households.
• A relatively larger area irrigated by earthen
dams as a percentage of total land irrigated
among medium and low endowment
households resulted in higher levels of fodder
grass production on private fields compared
to that on the fields of high endowment
households (table 7).
• Larger areas of land irrigated by earthen dams
as a proportion of total irrigated land among
low and medium categories of households led
to comparable increases in dung production
between the summer and winter.29
TABLE 7.
Fodder Production on Private Fields Relative to other Sources.
Endowment Category State Forests Private Fields Local Markets
(in kilos per month)  (in kilos per month)  (in kilos per month)1
High 1,450 3,500 55
Medium 1,202 3,843 527
Low 1,410 3,671 173
Landless households 831 875 13
Note: 1. Onequintal of dry fodder in local market cost Rs 200 in 2001. Between 1995 and 2001 the price of a quintal of dry fodder
increased by Rs 100.
TABLE 6.
Irrigation Intensity and Use of State Forests in Bharauli HRMS.
Endowment Arable land Fuelwood extraction  from Annual fodder   Dung production by season
category Irrigated by state forests by season extraction from (summer/monsoon/winter)
earthen dam (in kilos per month) state forests  in kilos per month)
(as a % total (in kilos
 land Irrigated per month)
Summer Monsoon Winter Summer Monsoon Winter
High 36 11.6 15.4 13.9 1,450 8.6 10 21.3
Medium 45 26 3.1 12 1,202 7.5 9.4 18
Low 70 14 6.5 12.9 1,410 5.4 9 15.6
29One must remember that in the case of high endowment household’s relatively lower percentage of land irrigated (as a percentage
of total land irrigated) by earthen dams was not being compensated by higher area under irrigation from alternative sources like
seasonal kuhls. Our analysis indicates that the percentage of land irrigated by kuhls as a percentage of total land irrigated was
highest for households in the low endowment category. The percentage of land irrigated by kuhls as a percentage of total area
irrigated was 63 percent, 60 percent and 88.2 percent for high, medium and low endowment categories of households, respectively.
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This report posed three sets of questions. First,
to what extent does the institutional contract for
co-management of land and water resources
ensure attention to issues of transparency and
accountability in watershed management?
Second, how does the institutional contract for
co-management of watershed resources influence
the provision of irrigation services? And third, how
does success with irrigation service provision
influence the distribution of benefits and costs
within farmer groups? To answer these questions,
a survey of watershed management groups
known as HRMS was undertaken in the Shiwalik
hills of Haryana.
It was found that the institutional contract for
the co-management of land and water resources
paid limited attention to issues of transparency
and accountability in the initial stages of a Ford
Foundation watershed management project in
Haryana. The lack of accountable and transparent
policy processes was seen in the technical
measures relating to design of earthen dams. As
a result of poor emphasis on transparent and
accountable policy processes, the constructed
earthen dams functioned poorly in the post-project
phase. This was evident from the fact that 31
percent of all dams constructed silted up within 5
years of construction and another 33 percent
within 10 years of their construction. Interestingly,
20 percent of dams that were constructed
functioned for less than a year.However, when
institutional issues relating to benefit sharing and
community consultation inthe construction of
earthen dams were emphasized at later stages of
the project the lifespan of earthen dams showed
a tendency to increase.
Our first conclusion confirms the broadly held
view that transparent and accountable policy
processes increase the potential for rural
communities to participate in the operation and
maintenance of physical infrastructure such as
irrigation head works, forest catchments and
Conclusions
distribution channels. The participation of rural
community groups in different aspects of irrigation
management may improve the effectiveness of
watershed management interventions. This report
also concludes that an institutional contract that
facilitates transparent and accountable policy
processes may potentially increase the number of
beneficiaries of irrigation projects. A substantial
sub-set of water users with an interest in water
use may serve as an incentive for relatively well
endowed individuals to participate in provision of
irrigation services.
The second conclusion this report draws is
that given an institutional contract that promotes
co-management relatively heterogeneous
community groups were more effective at
provision of irrigation services. Effective service
provisioning in heterogeneous groups becomes
possible through the presence of water
contractors and is reflected in orderly water
allocation, collection of irrigation service fees and
routine maintenance of irrigation infrastructure. By
contrast a relatively homogeneous community in
Thadion failed to provide irrigation services but
instead became embroiled in factional conflict.
This finding goes against the grain of findings of
previous studies which suggest that
heterogeneous groups may not be as adept at
cooperation in natural resource management when
compared to relatively homogeneous groups.30
The third conclusion of this report is that
success with service provision need not always
ensure a pro-poor distribution of benefits and
costs within rural communities. This assertion is
supported by the fact that cropping intensity
rates, agricultural incomes and productivity
increases and acreage under irrigation from
earthen dams- all tended to favor wealthier
households when compared to poorer households.
Although nonfarm incomes tended to reduce
levels of inequality in distribution of total
incomes, this reduction was not sufficient to
30For a review see Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Kurian and Dietz 2004.
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change overall income distribution in favor of
poorer households. Here, we emphasized the
underlying institutional concerns—poor returns on
nonfarm jobs, lower agricultural wage rates for
women and increasing competition for nonfarm
jobs that were traditionally performed by landless
households. From the point of view of analysis of
distribution of costs arising from watershed
management, we found that the workload for
women was greater than that of men as a result
of the doubling of agricultural yields under
irrigated conditions.
Our second and third conclusions cast doubts
over assumptions that blue prints for promoting
pro-poor community participation in natural
resources management are readily available. Our
case study reveals that ecological conditions,
local leadership and community-based norms of
social exchange can all play a role in facilitating
community participation. Although blueprints for
pro-poor community participation may not be
readily available, we may highlight certain
principles on such participation based on our
analysis of watershed management in Haryana:
• Ensure transparency of policy processes and
predictability of institutional contract to foster
private sector participation in provision of
irrigation services.
• Ensure fairness in benefit distribution to
facilitate farmer compliance with irrigation
service rules and minimize potential for
conflicts over resource use.
• Foster inter-sectoral policy coordination to re-
examine the need for state support for private
tubewell expansion (through subsidies) and to
address anomalies in the nonfarm labor
market with a view to dovetailing watershed
management projects within wider regional
programs of poverty alleviation.
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